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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 






Appearances: Stephen K. Underwood, Esq. 
1395 Union Rd. 
West Seneca, NY 14224 
Decision appealed: February 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 
months. 
Board Member(s) Coppola, Crangle 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived June 10, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Re.commendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Fonn 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
F~µ~l D~termination: The undersigned determine that the dec'isi~n appealed is hereby: 
,1 
V"Affirmed _·_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
~ffirmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to----
A Co · issioner 
... l1 vrc.-~ -~med _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Commissioner 
If the Final Determination is ·at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals .Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit' s Findings and the separate findings .of 
the Parole Board, if ~ny,. were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ;7.;/;1_//2· /{ . 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
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Appellant challenges the February 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 24-month hold. Appellant contends: (1) the Board’s denial of release was error in 
light of the COMPAS instrument scales; (2) the Offender Case Plan considered by the Board 
fails to comport with the requirements of Correction Law § 71-a; (3) the Board’s determination 
was bases solely on the severity of the offense and, therefore, was arbitrary and capricious; (4) 
the Board failed to consider all factors required by statute and, therefore, was arbitrary and 
capricious; (5) the Board’s decision was insufficiently detailed; and (6) appellant was denied due 
process because the Board’s deliberations were not recorded. 
Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or 
efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the 
law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate 
the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which are relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, 
the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State 
Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  
While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the 
Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 
872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of 
Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st 
Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them 
equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
Here, the record reflects that, during the interview, the Board discussed the instant offence, 
which involved the murder of a police officer guarding a witness to the sale of drugs by the 
criminal organization to which appellant belonged. The officer’s presence had been necessitated 
by death threats and the firebombing of the witness’s home in retaliation for complaining to the 
police about drug dealing in front of his residence. The police placed the witness under 24-hour 
protection. After the police arrested the individuals responsible for these crimes, the head of 
appellant’s organization ordered a retaliatory “hit” upon the police. Thereafter, appellant and his 
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codefendants planned and committed the murder of a police officer stationed in a patrol car in 
front of the witness’s residence. Appellant and his codefendants approached the vehicle from the 
rear and shot the 22-year-old victim multiple times, killing him before he was able to act to 
protect himself. 
The record further reflects that the Board considered, in addition to the severity of the offense, 
appellant’s institutional record, including his disciplinary history, vocational training and 
program participation, as well as appellant’s Case Plan and his COMPAS risk and needs 
assessment. The Board also considered appellant’s character references, and release plans. The 
record further reflects consideration of statements made supporting release and statements made 
opposing release. The statements opposing release included multiple statements of the District 
Attorney and of the Sentencing Court. In particular, the District Attorney has strenuously 
opposed release and the Sentencing Court made a “recommendation to the parole board that you 
are never paroled” at sentencing, a recommendation which has been reiterated in subsequent 
letters to the Board. 
In its decision, the Board noted appellant’s relatively good disciplinary history, his program 
participation and his low scores on the COMPAS risk and needs assessment, but concluded that 
the gravity of the offense was such that release would not be appropriate, noting the presence of 
significant aggravating factors. In particular, the Board highlighted the callousness of the murder 
and the fact that this murder was committed in retaliation for legitimate police activity in 
protecting a witness terrorized by a criminal organization. Thus, the Board determined that, 
because release would be “incompatible with the welfare of society” and would “so deprecate the 
seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law,” denial was warranted. Executive Law 
§ 259-i (2)(c)(A). 
Appellant now challenges the Board’s decision denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. 
Appellant’s first contention, that the Board’s determination denying parole despite appellant’s 
low scores on the COMPAS instrument failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to Executive 
Law § 259-c (4), is without merit.  
The 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case 
review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense.  The 
amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to 
apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the 
COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 
N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the 
Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three 
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standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 
1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 
994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 
56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  That is exactly what occurred here.   
Appellant’s second contention, the Offender Case Plan considered by the Board fails to comport 
with the requirements of Correction Law § 71-a, is without merit. “Correction Law § 71-a 
specifically directs DOCCS, not the Board, to develop a TAP to facilitate an inmate's eventual 
transition back into society. The Board is then expected to utilize the TAP, ‘where available,’ as 
part of its evaluation in determining an inmate’s suitability for parole release.” Matter of Rivera 
v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d at 1108-09, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 296, quoting Matter of 
Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 203, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866 (3d Dept.), appeal dismissed 24 
N.Y.3d 1052, 1053, 999 N.Y.S.2d 360 (2014). Thus, the Board satisfied its obligation to 
consider the available case plan.  
Appellant’s third contention, that the Board’s decision was improperly based solely on the 
severity of the offense, is without merit. 
As discussed above, the Board properly considered the applicable factors, including extreme 
gravity of the crime; the execution of a police officer stationed outside the home of a witness 
who had been subjected to death threats and the firebombing of his residence as a result of 
reporting the illegal activity of the organization to which appellant belonged. As the weight to be 
assigned each statutory factor is within the Board’s discretion, it committed no error by 
emphasizing the severity of the inmate’s offense over the other factors it properly considered.  
See Matter of Robinson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 162 A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 
235 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Jones v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 
151 A.D.3d 1622, 57 N.Y.S.3d 265 (4th Dept. 2017); Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 
1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Kirkpatrick v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 385, 772 
N.Y.S.2d 540 (2d Dept. 2004); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 
(1st Dept. 1998). 
While the Board does not agree that aggravating factors are always necessary to support reliance on 
an inmate’s crime, (Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714), there are multiple 
aggravating factors present here; appellant’s crimes went “well beyond the ‘unjustifiable taking 
and tragic loss of life’” that describes every murder.  Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 
at 22, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 125. Appellant’s offense represented an attempt by a criminal 
organization to retaliate against the police for acting to thwart the organization’s attempts to 
intimidate a witness to its crimes. Thus, the crime represented an attack on the rule of law as well 
as a particularly cold-blooded murder in its own right. 
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It should also be noted that a significant portion of discussion of the instant offense was occupied 
by appellant’s claims of innocence and his complaints regarding conduct of the criminal 
proceedings. While appellant is free to pursue whatever further challenges to the underlying 
convictions are still available, at the present moment these claims are contradicted by the results 
his direct appeal of the conviction (People v. Copeland, 197 A.D.2d 629, 602 N.Y.S.2d 683, (2d 
Dept. 1993), lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 903, 610 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1993)) and his federal habeas corpus 
challenge (Copeland v. Walker, 258 F. Supp. 2d 105 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)). Moreover, as the Third 
Department noted in its rejection of appellant’s prior challenge to a Board determination, “‘it is 
generally not [respondent's] role to reevaluate a claim of innocence’” Matter of Copeland v. N.Y. 
State Bd. of Parole, 154 A.D.3d 1157, 1158, 63 N.Y.S.3d 548, 550 (3d Dept. 2017.), quoting 
Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d at 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704. 
Thus, the Board properly based its account of the instant offense on the Pre-Sentence 
Investigation Report, upon which it is entitled to rely. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(d)(7); Matter of Carter v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1031, 1031, 916 N.Y.S.2d 291, 
293 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 16 N.Y.3d 712, 923 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2011).  See also Matter of Dolan 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 1059, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850, 852 (3d Dept. 
2014) (finding no “indication that respondent erroneously considered petitioner’s presentence 
investigation report, given that petitioner did not timely challenge the accuracy of any of the 
information in that report”), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 915, 4 N.Y.S.3d 601 (2015). 
Appellant’s fourth contention, the Board failed to properly consider all factors required by 
statute, is similarly without merit. As discussed above, the record reflects that the Board 
considered all applicable factors. That the Board found Appellant’s postconviction activities 
outweighed by the serious nature of his crimes does not constitute convincing evidence that the 
Board did not consider them (see Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 
A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994)), or render the decision irrational (see Matter of 
Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d at 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 418). 
Appellant’s fifth contention, that the Board’s decision was insufficiently detailed, is without 
merit. The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the 
denial of parole, particularly when evaluated in the context of the interview transcript. Matter of 
Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 11 N.Y.3d 777, 778, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602, 602 (2008); Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter 
of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 
2013).  
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Appellant sixth contention, that he was denied due process because the Board’s deliberations 
were not disclosed or recorded, is without merit. Contrary to his assertion, the Board is not 
required to record its internal deliberations or discussions.  Matter of Barnes v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 53 A.D.3d 1012, 862 N.Y.S.2d 639 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of Borcsok v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 34 A.D.3d 961, 823 N.Y.S.2d 310 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Collins 
v. Hammock, 96 A.D.2d 733, 465 N.Y.S.2d 84 (4th Dept. 1983). 
Consequently, appellant’s challenge the Board’s decision denying release is unavailing. 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
